Russia Is Adapting Their Strategies For Their Geran (Shahed) Drones

Russia’s Need For A New Strategy For Its Geran Drones

The primary Geran model used by Russia throughout the conflict has been the Geran-2, which is based on the Iranian Shahed-136. The Geran-2 features a delta-wing configuration with a wingspan of approximately 2.5 meters, a range of 2,500 km, and a 50 kg warhead. It is powered by a piston engine driving a pusher propeller, allowing it to reach speeds of 180 km/h. The baseline Geran-2 navigates autonomously along a pre-programmed route using an inertial navigation system aided by satellite navigation, requiring no operator control after launch. Its low cost has enabled Russia to mass produce the drones and incorporate hundreds of them into each nightly strike package to saturate Ukrainian air defenses.

In order to counter these Geran attacks, Ukraine has developed an extensive electronic warfare network. Because the drones rely on satellite navigation, Ukrainian jamming and spoofing systems interfere with their navigation signals, causing the Gerans to deviate from their programmed routes. Although these systems were highly effective early in the war, Russia has integrated improved satellite receivers into newer Geran variants, making them more resilient to Ukrainian electronic warfare.

The Gerans that survive Ukraine’s electronic warfare network must still penetrate a layered kinetic air-defense system. Long-range surface-to-air missile systems are generally reserved for higher-value threats, leaving Gerans to be engaged primarily by short- and medium-range air-defense systems, including the Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, NASAMS, IRIS-T, Avenger, and a wide range of anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns. Ukraine has also used fighter aircraft and helicopters to patrol likely approach routes and intercept Gerans before they reach their targets.

More recently, dedicated drone interceptors, such as the Sting Hornet, have become a major component of Ukraine’s air defenses. Ukraine is producing these interceptors in large numbers, allowing them to be employed against Gerans at scale. At approximately $2,000 per interceptor, they cost a fraction of the roughly $25,000 price of the baseline Geran-2, while newer Geran variants are considerably more expensive. When employed in sufficient numbers and in conjunction with Ukraine’s broader air-defense network, Ukraine is reportedly able to successfully counter 92 to 96 percent of the Gerans before they reach their targets. As a result, Ukraine has largely negated the economic advantage that originally made the Geran such an effective weapon. The strategy of overwhelming air defenses through mass alone is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, forcing Russia to rethink how it employs the Geran force.

New Geran Models And Variants

In response to Ukraine’s expanding air-defense network, Russia has introduced several modified Geran variants. Most notably, it has increased the deployment of jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones. Depending on the exact model, these drones can reach speeds between 300 and 500 km/h, a substantial increase over the piston-powered Geran-2, while carrying a comparable payload. Their higher speed reduces the engagement window available to Ukrainian air-defense systems and makes them significantly harder for interceptor drones to counter. They also cruise at higher altitudes, further complicating interception and reducing the effectiveness of some ground-based defensive systems.

Additionally, Russia has introduced remotely operated Geran variants that remain under operator control throughout portions of their flight. Unlike the original Geran drones, which were autonomous, these drones can maneuver in response to threats, alter their routes, and take evasive action when confronted by Ukrainian air defenses. Maintaining control over such long distances requires a robust communications link. Early variants reportedly relied on Starlink terminals, but more recent versions instead use onboard radio repeaters and relay drones to extend their control range.

Newer Geran variants have also incorporated increasingly sophisticated sensor packages. Electro-optical cameras allow operators or onboard processors to detect approaching interceptor drones and identify Ukrainian air-defense positions, enabling evasive maneuvers or providing targeting information for subsequent strike packages. Additionally, “Seeker” variants incorporate infrared sensors that enable the drone to acquire and track moving targets after arriving in the target area. Because these systems rely on onboard sensors rather than satellite navigation alone, they remain effective even in contested electromagnetic environments.

Russia’s New Geran Employment Strategy

Over the past month, Russia has reportedly shifted how it employs its Geran drones. Rather than relying solely on large salvos of identical drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, Russia is increasingly adopting a systems-level approach in which different Geran variants are assigned specialized roles. With the older approach, relatively few Gerans were reaching their targets and Ukraine was no longer expending expensive resources to counter them. As a result, the large drone salvos were no longer achieving their intended objectives. Additionally, newer Geran variants required increasingly sophisticated electronics and other components with limited availability, making large-scale attacks an increasingly inefficient use of resources.

Under this new employment strategy, Russia is placing greater emphasis on matching specific drone variants to specific mission sets. The original piston-powered Geran-2 continues to form the backbone of Russia’s daily strike campaign against targets along the frontlines. The Russian military has reportedly been launching approximately 200 of these drones per day against logistics facilities, fuel depots, warehouses, electrical infrastructure, trains, and other operational targets. These drones are typically employed as part of coordinated attacks, using a mesh network to share information and relay data. This reduces their reliance on satellite navigation and makes the strike package substantially more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare.

Meanwhile, the jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 are being reserved for higher-value targets deeper inside Ukraine. To increase the likelihood of a successful strike, Russian forces are reportedly conducting multiple stages of reconnaissance to identify vulnerabilities, confirm target locations, and map flight paths that minimize exposure to Ukrainian air defenses. These jet-powered variants are increasingly incorporated into larger strike packages alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, where their higher speed improves the likelihood of reaching heavily defended targets. The Russian Ministry of Defense has recently released videos showing Geran-4 strikes against targets including watercraft in Odesa, aircraft and training facilities in the Mykolaiv region, and oil production facilities in the Zaporizhzhia region. To meet the growing demand for these drones, Russia is diverting production resources from other Geran variants to increase Geran-4 output.

This shift represents a fundamental change in how Russia employs the Geran force. Rather than relying on large numbers of identical drones, Russia is increasingly assigning specific Geran variants to missions that best match their capabilities. The baseline Geran-2 continues to provide an inexpensive means of striking operational targets along the front, while more advanced variants are reserved for strategic targets that justify their additional cost and limited availability. Ukraine will adapt its defenses accordingly, and Russia will continue to evolve its Geran fleet and refine their employment. In doing so, both sides are extending the ongoing cycle of adaptation between offensive drones and defensive countermeasures.