WASHINGTON, DC – AUGUST 08: U.S. President Donald Trump (C) joins hands with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (L), and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (R) during a signing ceremony in the State Dining Room of the White House on August 8, 2025 in Washington, DC. The signed agreement is intended to bring an end to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijani that has lasted for decades. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)
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Last month, a critical geopolitical contest took place in the South Caucasus, when voters in Armenia went to the polls to appoint a new government. The June 7th parliamentary election was about far more than the composition of that country’s legislature. Rather, it constituted a referendum of sorts on its economic and political future.
For most of the post-Cold War era, Armenia had stayed deeply dependent on Russia, both politically and strategically. But over the past several years, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership, it has undertaken a more independent, sovereign course. This has included a long-overdue mending of fences with regional rival Azerbaijan, involvement in critical connectivity projects like the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) and the Middle Corridor, and deepening ties with both Europe and the United States.
These shifts have drawn Yerevan closer to the West. They have also challenged the influence of Russia and China, both of which have sought in recent years to dominate and direct Eurasian connectivity and trade.
All that helps explain the extraordinary scale of Russia’s efforts to undermine the June vote. Investigations and leaked documents have exposed a broad, coordinated attempt by Moscow to manipulate the Armenian election via information warfare and propaganda. It also weaponized a network of Russian-Armenian oligarchs – whose fortunes are tied to the Russian-dominated regional system – to try and reshape the country’s political landscape. (Most prominently, this has included Samvel Karapetyan, a construction and real estate magnate with close ties to Russian business and politics, who positioned himself as a leader of the anti-Pashinyan opposition despite lacking the constitutional standing to do so on account of his dual Armenian-Russian citizenship.)
The objective was clear: not simply to oust Prime Minister Pashinyan, but to reverse the broader reorientation that the country has pursued in recent years under his guidance. To no avail, however. Pashinyan’s “Civil Contract” Party persevered in the polls, securing a renewed mandate to continue its political course. The question now becomes how best to do so.
Here, Armenia’s constitution should naturally take center stage. In its present form, the country’s foundational document still rests on language that incorporates territorial claims to Azerbaijani land – specifically, a Declaration of independence that references the priority of Armenia’s reunification with the enclave of Karabakh, which is internationally recognized as territory belonging to Baku.
Notably, Pashinyan himself doesn’t seem to hold to this formulation, and the August 2025 framework deal he signed in Washington with Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, codifies an end to the broader conflict between the two countries. But that document alone can’t obviate constitutional provisions a future government might invoke to return to an earlier status quo that’s more favorable to Moscow (and by extension Beijing), and adversarial to everyone else.
Logically, then, the next phase to lock in Armenia’s evolution is a constitutional referendum that resets the terms of its foreign policy, including abandoning claims to territory that have already been settled. One is now being considered for the 2027 timeframe, and the stakes promise to be high. Moreover, passage of such a new compact is far from assured, particularly if the country’s nationalist opposition manages to mobilize effectively.
As long as Armenia’s constitution is still based on territorial claims that conflict with its neighbors, Yerevan’s recent strategic gains can still be reversed. Without that change, the current peace in the South Caucasus might last only as long as the current government remains in power in Yerevan. The United States and Armenia’s allies in the West have a stake in it lasting much longer.