Romania’s President Nicusor Dan (C) flanked by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky (C-R) and Poland’s President Karol Nawrocki (C-L) pose for a family picture with (1st row from L) Latvia’s President Edgars Rinkevics, Estonia’s President Alar Karis, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Lithuania’s President Gitanas Nauseda, Czech Republic’s President Petr Pavel Slovakia’s President Peter Pellegrini, and (2nd row from L) Hungary’s Ambassador to Romania Kissne Hlatki Katalin, Iceland’s Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office Benedikt Arnason, Sweden’s Defence Minister Pal Jonson, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno, Norway’s Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide, Bulgaria’s Permanent Representative to NATO Nikolay Milkov during the summit of the Bucharest Nine (B9) and the Nordic countries at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest, Romania on May 13, 2026. The event is under the overarching theme of ‘Delivering More for Transatlantic Security’ and will focus on transatlantic security and NATO’s forthcoming summit in Ankara. The B9 format, also known as NATO’s Eastern Flank, includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. (Photo by Mihai Barbu / AFP via Getty Images) / ADDING NAMES
AFP via Getty Images
Earlier this month, Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell announced that U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had ordered the withdrawal of approximately 5,000 troops from Germany. Parnell added that the policy change would be “completed over the next six to twelve months.” The decision follows a similar pattern set by the Trump Administration, when, in October 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense announced it would not replace a U.S. Army combat brigade leaving Romania. Then, following the announcement in early May of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany, Pentagon officials stated on May 15 that the U.S. had canceled plans to temporarily deploy 4,000 troops to Poland. These decisions have alarmed U.S. allies and partners in Europe.
But U.S. troop reductions in Europe may not stop there. According to NPR, U.S. President Donald Trump is also considering reducing the number of troops stationed in Italy and Spain. In its report, NPR noted that Trump would examine America’s presence in these two countries, adding that countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain have been unhelpful in their responses to the war in Iran. (Trump also announced on April 1 that he was strongly considering withdrawing the U.S. from NATO, given Europe’s inaction during the conflict in Iran.)
It is not the first time Trump has had a spat with Europe. Since taking office in January 2025, the United States and its European allies and partners have debated defense spending within NATO and methods on how to end Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. and European countries in NATO and the European Union have also had several disputes over tariffs and trade relations. At one point, Trump even threatened to annex Greenland. Now, in the most current series of disagreements between the U.S. and Europe, Trump has called on European countries to assist the U.S. and Israel in their fight against Iran, something that countries throughout Europe have declined to do.
Following the U.S. announcement this month to reduce its troop presence in Germany, German Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius warned that the Europeans “must take on more responsibility for [their] own security.” He added that Germany was on the “right track” by expanding its armed forces, and he called on other European countries to follow suit.
Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also called on Europe to strengthen its defense and national security. In a conversation with POLITICO, Rasmussen argued that Europe needs to “ramp up the production of weapons and ammunition.” He added that the Europeans need to establish “new defense plans and new military capabilities” to bolster security across the European continent. He concluded by stating that the Europeans “should be able to provide” their own conventional defense.
Discussions about European defense capabilities and strengthening the continent have resurfaced during Trump’s second term. During the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025, Trump called on European countries to increase their defense spending, prompting allies to commit to a 5% of GDP defense spending target. The Trump Administration has also argued that the U.S. has been too involved in Europe and signaled it would reduce its presence on the continent. This forced the Europeans to discuss how to accelerate defense-related investments and enhance Europe’s industrial base. In December 2025, the European Parliament also gathered to debate legislation about Europe’s defense industry and Readiness 2030, a program that seeks to rearm Europe by “enabling the [defense] industry to produce quickly and efficiently.” The Europeans, however, have not progressed quickly.
“The Europeans are still moving slowly on generating strategic autonomy, but that is partly due to the sheer scale of the problem,” Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla, an Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, told me in an interview. “Each country must increase the size of its conventional military, which is difficult in many countries due to budgetary concerns and limited public interest in military service. But to make up for the U.S. contribution to European defense, European states must do more than simply spend more on enlarging their militaries. They must also coordinate defense policies and invest in expensive enablers that the U.S. currently provides, like intelligence, airlift, logistics, and training on interoperability. This is difficult because it requires solving the coordination problem between an array of smaller militaries who are too weak on their own to check the Russian threat.”
Dr. Justina Budginaite-Froehly, a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council, stressed the defense-industrial part of this capability development problem. During our discussion, she told me that Europe’s defense-industrial response to current geopolitical shifts has so far remained too slow. “Defense companies continue to face production bottlenecks, slow permitting and certification, and too little long-term demand certainty to justify major investment in new production lines,” Budginaite-Froehly explained. “Governments are spending more, but industry needs multi-year contracts, clearer capability priorities, and faster procurement decisions. Readiness 2030 is a significant step toward fixing Europe’s defense financing and coordination problem, but it has not yet solved the supply-side problem.”
Despite these challenges, NATO and EU member states have acknowledged the need to prioritize defense investments and national security. Readiness 2030, for example, tries to push EU members to coordinate defense procurement. But it will take time for the Europeans to synchronize these efforts, and several countries are still facing production bottlenecks. Nonetheless, Europeans have finally begun to realize the importance of strengthening their national defense. Defense experts, policymakers, and national security observers will be watching closely to see whether Europe can build the collective resolve needed to secure the continent, and whether initiatives like Readiness 2030 can deliver on their promise.