Images captured from social media and posted on X by Exilenova_plus on May 5, 2026. The video shows a Ukrainain drone flying low over Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic. The target for the drone strike was the VNIIR-Progress plant, which produces parts for many Russian drones.
Social Media Capture
Since drones have become the defining feature of the modern battlefield, both Russia and Ukraine have deployed a wide range of counter-drone systems. Yet these counter-drone defenses are inherently reactive. They exploit specific vulnerabilities in drone technology, require constant updates, and remain only partially effective, with many drones still reaching their targets. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are shifting toward a more proactive approach by conducting deep strikes against their opponent’s drone production facilities. These strikes have increased in recent months, as both sides attempt to counter opposing drones before they can even be built.
Ukrainian Strikes on Russian Drone Infrastructure
Over the past months, Ukraine has increased its long-range strike campaign against Russia’s drone production infrastructure. One of the most prominent attacks occurred on April 19, 2026, when Ukrainian forces struck the Atlant Aero facility in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, using Neptune cruise missiles. The plant produced the commonly used Molniya strike-reconnaissance drones and components for the larger Orion drone. Satellite imagery released afterward showed extensive damage to production buildings and logistics areas. The facility was subsequently targeted multiple times in the following weeks.
The strikes on the Atlant Aero facility were part of a broader campaign against Russia’s drone manufacturing network. Later in April, Ukrainian forces targeted the BARS-Sarmat Special Purpose Center in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, a facility involved in the development of drones, robotic systems, and electronic warfare technologies. There have also been repeated strikes against the Progress factory, located in the Tambov Oblast. This facility produces sensors and electronics used in advanced Russian drones. Additionally, multiple Ukrainian strikes targeted the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan in April and early May 2026, where Russia assembles the Shahed-type drones used extensively in strikes against Ukraine. Reports indicate damage to production and assembly areas.
Image posted on Telegram showing the aftermath of Ukrainian strike on the “Atlant-Aero” factory in the city of Taganrog. The image was posted on April 18, 2026.
Social Media Capture
Ukraine is also expanding this campaign beyond drone assembly plants to target key enabling technologies and supply chains. On May 5, 2026, Ukrainian missiles and drones struck the VNIIR-Progress plant near Cheboksary in Russia’s Chuvash Republic. This facility produces the navigation receivers and antennas used in several Russian drone systems. In particular, the plant manufactures the Kometa navigation modules that are used extensively in Shahed-type drones and glide bombs to resist GPS spoofing and electronic warfare interference. Ukrainian and Russian reports indicate that the strike caused fires and significant damage to the facility.
The attack on VNIIR-Progress illustrates a more brute-force approach to counter-drone warfare. Rather than continuously improving GPS spoofing techniques, Ukraine targeted the production source of the Kometa chips themselves. By degrading Russia’s ability to manufacture these modules, Ukraine can increase the effectiveness of its existing electronic warfare systems.
Russian Strikes on Ukrainian Drone Infrastructure
The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on its Telegram channel that between April 25 and May 1, it had conducted six long-range strikes against Ukrainian targets. The post explicitly highlighted that some of these strikes were aimed at “assembly, storage, and launch areas of attack unmanned aerial vehicles.” Similar references have appeared in its weekly summaries over the last few months, indicating that Russia is increasingly prioritizing the targeting of Ukraine’s drone ecosystem.
Russia is particularly targeting facilities related to long-range strike drones. Over the past months, Russia has launched a number of strikes against facilities around Kyiv linked to the production of Liutyi long-range drones. These drones have been used extensively in attacks against Russian oil infrastructure and military-industrial sites, making their production a high-priority target. Russian strikes have also reportedly targeted workshops involved in assembling and modifying FPV strike drones, which Ukraine uses extensively along the front lines.
Image capture from a video posted on social media showing a large number of Russian Geran-2 striking the city of Khakiv in August 2025. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that these strikes were targeting drone assembly plants.
Social Media Capture
Similar to Ukraine, Russia is targeting Ukrainian facilities that produce key components for drones. Russia has launched repeated strikes on industrial zones in Kharkiv and Dnipro associated with Ukraine’s defense-industrial base, including facilities reportedly involved in drone-enabling technologies such as communications systems, guidance components, and electronic warfare support. These strikes, along with others across Ukraine, reflect a broader effort to disrupt the supply chains that enable drone operations at scale.
Why These Strikes On Drone Facilities Are Increasing
The increase in strikes against drone production facilities follows from the challenges both sides are facing in countering adversarial drones. A growing number of Russian drones are penetrating Ukrainian defenses as they are equipped with more advanced electronics, improved processing power, and greater autonomy. For Russia, the challenge is different but equally constraining. It lacks the capacity to provide sufficient air-defense coverage for the wide range of military and industrial sites dispersed across its territory. Although some of these sites may have drone jamming systems, their effectiveness is declining in the face of Ukrainian adaptations, including the use of Starlink-enabled communication.
A second driver is the rapid improvement in drone capabilities on both sides, particularly in range and precision. Ukraine has steadily expanded the reach of its strike drones, fielding systems such as the Liutyi and the modified UJ-22 variants that have struck targets hundreds of kilometers inside Russia. More recent operations have reportedly reached as far as Tatarstan, over 1,000 kilometers from Ukrainian territory. At the same time, Russian Shahed-type drones have evolved to include improved navigation systems, faster speeds, collaboration between systems, and greater resistance to electronic warfare. Some variants may also include operator control during the terminal phase, allowing for more accurate strikes.
Image posted on social media on February 6, 2026. The image shows a collection of Ukrainian long-range attack drones including an An-196 Liutyi, UJ-22 Airborne, UJ-26 Bober, and an unnamed turbojet drone.
Social Media Capture
These improvements are reinforced by increasingly effective intelligence on both sides. Russia retains a large and capable intelligence apparatus, including space-based assets with strong imaging capabilities. Meanwhile, Ukraine has developed a highly adaptive intelligence system of its own and, according to Russian claims, receives significant external support. Over the past four years of war, both sides have built detailed knowledge of targets through pattern of life analysis, satellite imagery, and human sources. This has made it easier to identify drone production facilities, supporting infrastructure, and key vulnerabilities.
Implications Of These Strikes On The War
These strikes on drone production facilities and supporting infrastructure will produce direct operational effects. Both Russia and Ukraine do not have large stockpiles of these drones, often expending them soon after they are produced. As a result, disruptions at production sites reduce the number of drones available for use, in turn constraining the scale and frequency of attacks. Smaller and less frequent attacks are easier for each country’s counter-drone systems to handle.
However, these effects are not decisive, since both Russia and Ukraine have built relatively resilient supply chains. Production is dispersed across multiple locations, and damaged facilities can be rapidly repaired. Both sides also maintain relationships with external partners to supply critical components. As a result, production will recover over time, limiting the long-term impact of individual strikes.
This dynamic mirrors the “attack the network” approach used by Coalition forces in the Global War on Terror to counter improvised explosive devices. In addition to mitigating individual threats, Coalition forces targeted the networks responsible for producing and deploying them. Over time, this reduced but did not eliminate the threat. The approach now used by Russia and Ukraine reflects a similar logic. Combined with existing air defense and counter-drone measures, deep strikes against drone production facilities will reduce, but not eliminate, the threat posed by the other side’s drones.