Russia Launched A Large Mechanized Assault. It Was Not Successful.

Russia’s Return To Mechanized Assaults

The assault took place southeast of Dobropillya in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast on July 22. The first details emerged on July 24, when the Phoenix Unit of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service released combat footage showing Russian armored vehicles being destroyed as they advanced toward Ukrainian positions. A day later, the First Corps Azov of the Ukrainian National Guard reported that the attack was part of a larger, multi-axis offensive targeting villages around Shakhove. The Ukrainian unit released a detailed video combining footage from the Phoenix Unit with videos collected by other Ukrainian units.

According to the First Corps Azov, the offensive involved elements of Russia’s 8th and 41st Combined Arms Armies along with the 90th Tank Division. Although Azov described the attack as involving “two armies and a tank division,” the assault element visible in the released footage appears much smaller, likely a reinforced company-sized force. Nevertheless, it represents one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults recorded in the past year. The attacking force included tanks, armored fighting vehicles, BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, commercial trucks, and supporting infantry. It also employed numerous two-person motorcycle teams operating independently of the armored vehicles. The assault was supported by Gerbera and Lancet drones that attempted to suppress Ukrainian drone operations ahead of the advancing force. Unlike the dense armored columns seen during the early stages of the war, the vehicles advanced with significant spacing between them. The attack advanced toward Shakhove along multiple axes, including the Boikivka-Mayak-Shakhove corridor, with separate elements maneuvering toward different objectives.

Ukrainian reconnaissance drones detected the advancing force and directed a rapid response. The Phoenix Unit employed FPV drones, heavy bomber drones, and artillery, while footage released by other Ukrainian units showed additional strikes against armored vehicles elsewhere along the axis. Ukrainian forces had previously laid minefields along the likely avenues of approach and damaged bridges leading toward their positions. During the assault, Russian forces reportedly attempted to restore the crossings with pontoon bridges, but these were destroyed by Ukrainian tactical aviation. Altogether, the First Corps Azov reported the destruction of seven tanks, six armored fighting vehicles, one BM-21 Grad, one Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system, three pieces of specialized equipment, 47 light vehicles, and more than 150 Russian casualties.

Since the Russian Ministry of Defense has not released details about the operation, it is not known if any of the Russian forces reached their objectives. Regardless, it is unlikely that any armored vehicles advanced beyond the engagement area without being detected. Some of the infantry traveling on motorcycles may have bypassed the main engagement and reached their intended infiltration positions.

Russia’s Decision To Try A Mechanized Assault

More than a year ago, Russian forces largely moved away from this style of attack after drones repeatedly inflicted heavy losses while yielding little battlefield success. Additionally, the Phoenix Unit noted that it had not seen an assault of this scale in its area of responsibility for a considerable period. As such, it is unclear why Russian commanders ordered this large mechanized assault.

One possible explanation is that the assault was intended to exploit the groundwork laid by Russia’s recent infiltration campaign. For months, Russian forces have relied on small groups of infantry to establish concealed positions near Ukrainian defensive lines. These infiltration sites harass defenders, identify weak points, and create opportunities for follow-on operations. However, they lack the firepower and mass needed to achieve a breakthrough. A large mechanized assault could have been the next step if Russian commanders believed enough infiltration sites had been established to support the advance.

Another possibility is that Russia sought to exploit a shift in Ukraine’s defensive posture. Ukrainian forces have increasingly focused on detecting and eliminating small infiltration groups before they can establish positions. This has required extensive drone reconnaissance and rapid-response strike teams operating across a broad area. If those resources were concentrated on countering infiltrations, Russian planners may have assessed that a larger mechanized assault had a greater chance of reaching the main defensive line before Ukraine could mass drones, artillery, and anti-tank weapons against it.

The assault may also have served as a diversion. A large number of armored vehicles would naturally attract Ukrainian reconnaissance assets, drones, artillery, and reserve forces. While Ukraine concentrated on destroying the armored vehicles, smaller Russian infantry teams moving on motorcycles may have had a better opportunity to reach their intended infiltration positions. The available footage shows motorcycle teams operating independently of the armored vehicles, suggesting they were not simply accompanying the assault but may have been pursuing a related objective under the cover of the larger attack.

Russia’s Evolving Tactics and Technologies

While the assault itself is noteworthy, the drone footage also provides insight into the latest Russian tactics and equipment. One of the most obvious changes was the assault formation. Unlike the armored columns employed earlier in the war, the vehicles were widely dispersed. This spacing reduced the likelihood that Ukraine could identify and strike the entire formation at once. Furthermore, it limited the risk that a destroyed vehicle would create a bottleneck and halt the advance. At the same time, the vehicles remained close enough to maintain communications and coordinate their movement.

Another notable change was the absence of extensive anti-drone armor. Over the past two years, Russian armored vehicles have adopted a range of modifications to improve their survivability against drones. The latest development is hedgehog-style armor, which surrounds the vehicle with unraveled steel cables intended to snag, disrupt, or prematurely detonate incoming FPV drones. Instead, in this assault, many of the tanks carried only a small canopy over the commander’s hatch with a thin steel plate, likely intended to provide standoff protection against munitions dropped by heavy bomber drones. The decision to forgo heavier armor likely reflects the mobility penalties associated with these modifications. In addition to reducing speed and maneuverability, Russian crews have reported transmission failures after relatively short movements with the added weight.

The column was accompanied by soldiers on motorcycles and in commercial trucks. While some of the motorcycle teams remained mounted and attempted to outrun the drones, most appeared to follow a tactic previously shown in a social media post about Russian training. They quickly dismounted and dispersed into nearby vegetation, using the foliage for cover and concealment. The drones largely focused on the vehicles, allowing many of the soldiers to continue their advance on foot. This suggests the motorcycles and trucks may have been intended to rapidly transport troops toward their objectives rather than serve as protected vehicles throughout the assault.

The Operational Implications Of This Assault

More broadly, the assault reflects the difficult position facing the Russian military. Despite gradual territorial gains over the past year, progress has come at a high cost in personnel and equipment. At the same time, Russian leadership continues to demand offensive operations rather than a transition to a defensive posture. Under these conditions, Russian commanders have strong incentives to continue experimenting with new assault tactics, with the hope of breaking this stalemate.

Russia will likely continue using a limited number of mechanized assaults while relying primarily on small-unit infiltrations. Although these infiltrations have produced only incremental gains, they have maintained constant pressure along the front. Mechanized assaults offer the possibility, although not the guarantee, of achieving a larger breakthrough if they can penetrate Ukraine’s defensive belt. The Dobropillya assault suggests that Russia will continue to refine its tactics and equipment in search of a more effective approach. However, it is unclear whether these adaptations will be sufficient to break through Ukraine’s constantly evolving drone-centered defenses.