Russia’s Drone Warriors Are Preparing For A “Big War” With NATO

Not Threats But Plans

Russian political commentators make threats against the West all the time. But this is practical preparation for drone war. Dronnitsa is a technical forum to identify problems and solve them, including learning from the enemy. This is not the usual Russian way.

“The candid discission at the previous Dronnitsa of what the Ukrainian military was doing right with respect to drones shocked some high-level Russian government officials in attendance, who were not used to public praise of the enemy,” says Bendett.

The forum is about finding solutions. At Dronnitsa-2023 one of the big talking points was how Ukrainian radio jammers were making Russian drones useless. The following year’s session saw the launch of the KVN drone controlled via a trailing fiber-optic cable, immune to radio jamming. This has become one of Russia’s most successful weapons, and arguably Ukraine has not quite caught up in fiber drones.

Russia is behind Ukraine in the drone arms race, but ahead of the rest of the world. The U.S. currently produces about 50,000 drones a year , Russia makes a hundred times as many with production measured in millions . The U.S. is catching up fast though, and the Russians know this, aware that there is a narrow window of time for Russia to take advantage. And the advantage is huge; recent exercises suggest that opponents fielding drones en masse could obliterate current Western forces.

Drones are the cutting edge of the Russian war machine, and Dronnitsa is charged with keeping that edge sharp. Previous themes were “learning from mistakes,” “operator training” and “organizing drone teams.” When the new priority is “prepare for a big war with NATO,” something has changed.

Putin’s Strategy

The reason is not hard to see. With the war in Ukraine at a stalemate at best, Putin desperately needs a victory to shore up his position.

The last time Moscow brought its army home after a defeat was in 1989 when troops returned from the failed invasion of Afghanistan. These “Afghansti” veterans brought back the truth about that war, which was different to the heroic accounts which Russian media had been peddling for the previous nine years. The Afghansti set up grassroots organizations demanding medical care, pensions and housing. This was the first time people had challenged the authority of the state and organized on their own, and the Afghansti played a significant role in the collapse of the Soviet system two years later.

Putin, who saw the Afghansti firsthand and stresses that they fought with honor and should be treated well, knows the danger of a repeat. And Russia’s temporary advantage in drones might just give him a way.

A fast invasion of the Baltics, enabled by drone superiority, could deliver success after four years of failure in Ukraine. Bendett points out that in recent months Russia has built a series of giant new bases in the region adjacent to the Baltics , enough for an invasion force of more than 100,000 which should be enough to steamroller Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia unless they can be rapidly reinforced.

Learning From Iran

Russian military analysts have been encouraged by the conflict between the US and Iran. Using nothing but drones, Iran hit many U.S. bases, exposing the limits of air and missile defenses, and imposed huge costs on its superior adversary. Russia has massive stockpiles of Iranian-designed Shahed drones, and millions of tactical FPVs, and Putin may hope for a rapid advance against the lightly defended Baltics. Fast, decisive action could intimidate NATO into hesitating over a response.

Faced with recapturing a large swather of occupied territory, NATO would be looking at the risk of a prolonged, bloody conflict and getting bogged down in the sort of trench warfare seen in Ukraine. At the same time, while NATO would undoubtedly be able to establish air superiority, the Iran experience has shown that this is not enough to stop strikes by massed long-range drones. These might strike airbases as well as refineries and other vulnerable targets in Europe.

In this situation, many in the U.S. might be tempted to back off and let the bear keep its gains.

However, there are other explanations. Bendett says that Dronnitsa’s agenda may have been prompted by Russian jitters about losing the war and how vulnerable they now are to an attack by NATO.

“The organizers may be echoing Putin and the Russian government accusing NATO of preparing for war and therefore Russia must be ready for such confrontation,” says Bendett.

Either way Dronnsitsa may be dominated by new discussions of technical solutions for destroying American tanks and American air defenses, and ways of hitting American air bases. And, as with previous sessions, new hardware will follow quickly.

When Russia built up forces on the border with Ukraine in 2022, many were still in denial that an invasion was imminent. This time we have ample warning that something may be in the air. This time we may be able to stop an invasion before it happens.

The best deterrent might be clear and united political statements that Russian aggression against any NATO member will be met with maximum force. Some redeployment may be needed to ensure that the military force is available to meet this commitment in the Baltics.

And, at the same time, the U.S. and others need to keep on building up their own drone forces – and maybe considering a Dronnitsa drone gathering of our own.